Introduction to Humanities

 Introduction to Humanities (2215) – HUMN 100 6981 Introduction to Humanities (2215)

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Week 8: Conclusion

HUMN 100 6981 Introduction to Humanities (2215) OO

Conclusion

Cogito ergo sum. I think, therefore, I

am. —René Descartes

Pure Existence Pierces an Opening to Express Itself in the Phenomenal World by James

Welling

Metropolitan Museum of Art Open Access “The Met Collection”

Overview Eight weeks ago, we started on a journey into the depth and breadth of the humanities.

As you now know, the disciplines of the humanities—literature, performance arts, visual

arts, philosophy, and religion—contain multiple expressions of what it means to be human.

Such expressions allow us to see, hear and experience how human beings anywhere in the

world use their creativity to share with us what they see, hear and experience.

Let us celebrate how in the past few weeks you’ve obtained a deeper and broader

understanding of the importance of the humanities. Your responses and written

documents attest to the fact that you have taken the time to explore and critically analyze

 

 

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what you’ve been presented with. This celebration is important because when we are able

to appreciate an artistic expression, we are indeed forging a bond, a community of sorts,

with the artist or artists that created it. The more we appreciate the arts, the stronger—

and more enchanting—our global community will be. That’s how a theatrical production, a

song, a dance, a painting, a poem, or a book in our midst allows us to connect—in richer

and fuller ways—to similar yet distinct artistic expressions anywhere in the world.

Take a moment now to think about how your knowledge and skills have grown over the

last eight weeks. Hopefully, you’ve done more than just “staring at yourself.”

Can you see where you are now versus where you started?

Delving into the rich expressions of writers, poets, sculptors, actors, musicians, and

philosophers from all over the world, have you gained new insights into our shared

humanity (or shared human condition)?

Have you learned to appreciate arts in all forms, regardless of whether you like the

form or not?

Can you describe to others the value of understanding more of the world because

of the humanities?

Given the choice, would you stick with the familiar and usual, or would you be

willing to continue taking risks to explore the diverse, the remote, even the

unknown?

Needless to say, the course was simply a starting point, the opening of a door leading to

increased explorations of your own creativity and the creativity of anyone, anywhere,

anytime. Yet, what you’ve seen, heard, felt and experienced are major accomplishments

that need to be celebrated, even shared.

The journey of a thousand miles begins with one step.

—Lao Tzu

Learning Outcomes

Following is a list of the Week 8 outcomes, mapped to the corresponding course

outcome. The course outcomes give “the big picture,” and the weekly outcomes provide

more detailed information that will help you achieve the course outcomes.

Week 8 Outcomes

Reflect upon what you have learned over the past seven weeks (1, 4).

Reflect upon what new insights you have gained about the human condition

through the study of various writers, poets, sculptors, actors, musicians, and

philosophers (3, 4).

 

 

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Week 8 Checklist Checklist

Week 8 Study Guide Web Page

WEEK 8 DISCUSSION: Reflecting Discussion Topic

Reflect upon the variety of ways humans express themselves culturally (1, 3, 4).

Reflect upon the value of the humanities to the world and to contemporary

American society (1, 3).

Reflect upon the ways this course has possibly changed your perspective upon the

world and upon your place within the world (1, 4).

Course Outcomes Met in Week 8

Describe and analyze the way human culture is expressed through works of

literature, performing and visual arts, philosophy, and religion in order to appreciate

the depth and breadth of the humanities disciplines.

Use basic vocabulary, concepts, methods, and theories of the humanities disciplines

in order to describe and analyze cultural and artistic expressions.

Identify and apply criteria in order to evaluate individual and collective cultural

accomplishments.

Examine individual and cultural perspectives in the field of humanities in order to

recognize and assess cultural diversity and the individual’s place in the world.

0 % 0 of 4 topics complete

Read the Weekly Overview & Learning Goals

Participate in our Discussions

Compose your Final Project Part 3

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR DISCUSSIONS: Your contributions should be thoughtful

and developed. Answer all parts of the question and use concepts from the course

materials. Use a professional style of communication, with attention to grammar, spelling,

and typos; cite your sources.

 

 

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Unless your instructor specifies otherwise, choose TWO of the following questions, and

give a substantive response to at least two other students.

ANSWER TWO.

1. REFLECT ON YOUR OWN LEARNING. Please identify and share one of the most

meaningful insights you obtained from the course. This insight must be strictly about you.

2. REFLECT ON THE ARTISTIC EXPRESSIONS OF OTHERS. From the many artistic

expressions provided in the course (paintings, photographs, videos, links, etc.), choose one

that identifies a meaningful experience in the course. Explain why you chose that object

and why it is meaningful. If possible, paste a copy or the link. Imagine that your choice

will become a part of a Course Album of Meaningful Objects and your choice will be your

contribution to the album.

3. REFLECT ON YOUR LEARNING ACCOMPLISHMENTS WITH YOUR FELLOW

STUDENTS. What would you tell them about your experience together? What would

you say to encourage them to continue their exploration of the humanities? How might

you use the tools for interpretation that you have learned about in your life or at your

job?

4. PERSONAL GROWTH. Paraphrasing Einstein, a person cannot grow remaining static—

it takes new ideas, fresh thoughts and inspiration to bring about transformation. This is

why the humanities are important. Where do you see the humanities helping you grow as

a person?

5. “DEAR JOHN…” Write a letter to a friend about the course. In 150-300 words, tell

your friend why you think the course would be valuable and personally enriching.

Describe what you think they would learn from taking the course, and evaluate any

aspect of the course that you think would be most relevant to your friend.

6. REFLECT ON THE VALUE OF THE HUMANITIES. There is a big focus on STEM fields

of studies today, science, technology, engineering and math. However, there are those

who argue for STEAM, which includes the arts. What do you think the value of the

humanities are to other fields? How might you convince someone in a STEM field of this

value. This article from the Atlantic may be of use in thinking about your response.

7. REFLECT ON YOUR POSITION IN THE CAVE. We began this semester talking about

Plato’s Allegory of the Cave. How can you use this allegory to discuss your experience of

going through this class and your understanding of the Humanities? For instance, are you

still chained in the cave watching shadows on the wall? Have you moved outside of the

cave? Do you exist in both places now with regards to the Humanities? Do you prefer one

place over another? Explain.

 

 

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Final Project, Part 3. Paper Assignment

Due August 10 at 11:59 PM

You will not see any other postings until you post your own.

Initial posts are due by Saturday at 11:30PM ET and at least two responses to fellow

classmates are expected by the end of the academic week on Tuesday by 11:30PM ET.

Click here to view the full Final Project description.

Final Project, Part 3: Paper.

This part of the final project is the paper that presents your description and analysis of

your selected works.

In a 750-1200 word essay:

Explain the subject you chose and why it’s worth exploring in the Humanities

Describe each of your selected examples, including 1) information about its

creator; 2) its historical or cultural context (how it fits into a historical period’s or a

specific culture’s attitudes, events etc. Think about what else was going on in the

culture and history when the piece was created); and 3) link to the example or an

embedded image with a citation in the paper where you write about each example.

Use at least one specific interpretative tool, concept or method from the course to

explain each of your selected examples. You should use a different tool, concept or

method for each example, so you should use at least three different tools in your

paper.

Assess the effectiveness or impact of each representation. In other words, how

well did the representation present the subject? How effective was it? What

impact did this representation have? What specific elements of the representation

lead you to your conclusions?

Provide a correctly formatted paper, complete and proper citations for any

references you consult, using MLA format

Documentation Style: The paper is to be formatted and documented in the MLA format.

For general assistance, see the links below to the UMGC Library.

MLA Citation: http://sites.umgc.edu/library/libhow/mla_tutorial.cfm

MLA Citation Examples: http://sites.umgc.edu/library/libhow/mla_examples.cfm

 

 

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STOP: Before you hand in your assignment, make sure to ask yourself the following

questions:

1. Have I included a paragraph that provides one to two logical, concrete, well-stated

reasons that this subject is worth exploring within the Humanities?

2. Have I included least two to three sentences for each example that clearly and

concretely provide information about its creator, cultural/historical context, and

where I found it-an image or link?

3. Have I included at least one to three sentences that explains and applies a specific

interpretative tool, concept or method that is from the course’s Learning Resources

each example?

4. Have I included at least one to three sentences that contains an assessment of the

effectiveness of each example in representing the chosen subject?

5. Have I provided a list of resources and do all of my citations conform to MLA 8th

edition guidelines?

6. Have I proofread this assignment for grammatical, structural, and spelling errors that might impede someone from understanding what I am trying to say?

 

Due Date for Part 3: This submission is due during Week 8, with the final day of

submission being the Tuesday of the eighth week (11:30pm ET). Please see the Course

Schedule for the exact final due date for this submission. The submission should be

carefully edited and proofed for standard use of English.

 

Order a Similar Paper

Sensations and Brain Processes

Sensations and Brain Processes Author(s): J. J. C. Smart Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 68, No. 2 (Apr., 1959), pp. 141-156 Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2182164 Accessed: 25/08/2008 18:06

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SENSATIONS AND BRAIN PROCESSES

SUPPOSE that I report that I have at this moment a roundish, blurry-edged after-image which is yellowish towards its

edge and is orange towards its centre. What is it that I am reporting?’ One answer to this question might be that I am not reporting anything, that when I say that it looks to me as though there is a roundish yellowy orange patch of light on the wall I am expressing some sort of temptation, the temptation to say that there is a roundish yellowy orange patch on the wall (though I may know that there is not such a patch on the wall). This is perhaps Wittgenstein’s view in the Philosophical Investigations (see paragraphs 367, 370). Similarly, when I “report” a pain, I am not really reporting anything (or, if you like, I am reporting in a queer sense of “reporting”), but am doing a sophisticated sort of wince. (See paragraph 244: “The verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.” Nor does it describe anything else?) 2 I prefer most of the time to discuss an after- image rather than a pain, because the word “pain” brings in something which is irrelevant to my purpose: the notion of “distress.” I think that “he is in pain” entails “he is in distress,” that is, that he is in a certain agitation-condition.3 Similarly, to say “I am in pain” may be to do more than “replace pain behavior”: it may be partly to report something, though this

1 This paper takes its departure from arguments to be found in U. T. Place’s “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?” (British Journal of Psychology, XLVII, 1956, 44-50). I have had the benefit of discussing Place’s thesis in a good many universities in the United States and Australia, and I hope that the present paper answers objections to his thesis which Place has not considered, and presents his thesis in a more nearly unobjectionable form. This paper is meant also to supplement “The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical’,” by H. Feigl (in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, II, 370-497), which argues for much the same thesis as Place’s.

2 Some philosophers of my acquaintance, who have the advantage over me in having known Wittgenstein, would say that this interpretation of him is too behavioristic. However, it seems to me a very natural interpretation of his printed words, and whether or not it is Wittgenstein’s real view it is certainly an interesting and important one. I wish to consider it here as a possible rival both to the “brain-process” thesis and to straight-out old-fashioned dualism.

3 See Ryle, Concept of Mind (New York, 1949), p. 93.

‘4’

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something is quite nonmysterious, being an agitation-condition, and so susceptible of behavioristic analysis. The suggestion I wish if possible to avoid is a different one, namely that “I am in pain” is a genuine report, and that what it reports is an irre- ducibly psychical something. And similarly the suggestion I wish to resist is also that to say “I have a yellowish orange after-image” is to report something irreducibly psychical.

Why do I wish to resist this suggestion? Mainly because of Occam’s razor. It seems to me that science is increasingly giving us a viewpoint whereby organisms are able to be seen as physico- chemical mechanisms:4 it seems that even the behavior of man himself will one day be explicable in mechanistic terms. There does seem to be, so far as science is concerned, nothing in the world but increasingly complex arrangements of physical con- stituents. All except for one place: in consciousness. That is, for a full description of what is going on in a man you would have to mention not only the physical processes in his tissue, glands, nervous system, and so forth, but also his states of consciousness: his visual, auditory, and tactual sensations, his aches and pains. That these should be correlated with brain processes does not help, for to say that they are correlated is to say that they are something “over and above.” You cannot correlate something with itself. You correlate footprints with burglars, but not Bill Sikes the burglar with Bill Sikes the burglar. So sensations, states of con- sciousness, do seem to be the one sort of thing left outside the physicalist picture, and for various reasons I just cannot believe that this can be so. That everything should be explicable in terms of physics (together of course with descriptions of the ways in which the parts are put together-roughly, biology is to physics as radio-engineering is to electromagnetism) except the occurrence of sensations seems to me to be frankly unbelievable. Such sensations would be “nomological danglers,” to use Feigl’s expression.5 It is not often realized how odd would be the laws

4On this point see Paul Oppenheim and Hilary Putnam, “Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis,” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, II, 3-36; also my note “Plausible Reasoning in Philosophy,” Mind, LXVI

(I957), 75-78. 6 Feigl, op. cit., p. 428.

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whereby these nomological danglers would dangle. It is sometimes asked, “Why can’t there be psycho-physical laws which are of a novel sort, just as the laws of electricity and magnetism were novelties from the standpoint of Newtonian mechanics?” Cer- tainly we are pretty sure in the future to come across new ultimate laws of a novel type, but I expect them to relate simple constit- uents: for example, whatever ultimate particles are then in vogue. I cannot believe that ultimate laws of nature could relate simple constituents to configurations consisting of perhaps billions of neurons (and goodness knows how many billion billions of ultimate particles) all put together for all the world as though their main purpose in life was to be a negative feedback mecha- nism of a complicated sort. Such ultimate laws would be like nothing so far known in science. They have a queer “smell” to them. I am just unable to believe in the nomological danglers themselves, or in the laws whereby they would dangle. If any philosophical arguments seemed to compel us to believe in such things, I would suspect a catch in the argument. In any case it is the object of this paper to show that there are no philosophical arguments which compel us to be dualists.

The above is largely a confession of faith, but it explains why I find Wittgenstein’s position (as I construe it) so congenial. For on this view there are, in a sense, no sensations. A man is a vast arrangement of physical particles, but there are not, over and above this, sensations or states of consciousness. There are just behavioral facts about this vast mechanism, such as that it expresses a temptation (behavior disposition)- to say “there is a yellowish-red patch on the wall” or that it goes through a sophisticated sort of wince, that is, says “I am in pain.” Admit- tedly Wittgenstein says that though the sensation “is not a something,” it is nevertheless “not a nothing either” (paragraph 304), but this need only mean that the word “ache” has a use. An ache is a thing, but only in the innocuous sense in which the plain man, in the first paragraph of Frege’s Foundations of Arith- metic, answers the question “what is the number one?” by “a thing.” It should be noted that when I assert that to say “I have a yellowish-orange after-image” is to express a temptation to assert the physical-object statement “there is a yellowish-orange patch

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on the wall,” I mean that saying “I have a yellowish-orange after-image” is (partly) the exercise of the disposition6 which is the temptation. It is not to report that I have the temptation, any more than is “I love you” normally a report that I love someone. Saying “I love you” is just part of the behavior which is the exercise of the disposition of loving someone.

Though, for the reasons given above, I am very receptive to the above “expressive” account of sensation statements, I do not feel that it will quite do the trick. Maybe this is because I have not thought it out sufficiently, but it does seem to me as though, when a person says “I have an after-image,” he is making a genuine report, and that when he says “I have a pain,” he is doing more than “replace pain-behavior,” and that “this more” is not just to say that he is in distress. I am not so sure, however, that to admit this is to admit that there are nonphysical correlates of brain processes. Why should not sensations just be brain pro- cesses of a certain sort? There are, of course, well-known (as well as lesser-known) philosophical objections to the view that reports of sensations are reports of brain-processes, but I shall try to argue that these arguments are by no means as cogent as is commonly thought to be the case.

Let me first try to state more- accurately the thesis that sensa- tions are brain processes. It is not the thesis that, for example, “after-image” or “ache” means the same as “brain process of sort X” (where “X” is replaced by a description of a certain sort of brain process). It is that, in so far as “after-image” or “ache” is a report of a process, it is a report of a process that happens to be a brain process. It follows that the thesis does not claim that sensation statements can be translated into statements about brain processes.7 Nor does it claim that the logic of a sensation statement is the same as that of a brain-process state-

6 Wittgenstein did not like the word “disposition.” I am using it to put in a nutshell (and perhaps inaccurately) the view which I am attributing to Wittgenstein. I should like to repeat that I do not wish to claim that my interpretation of Wittgenstein is correct. Some of those who knew him do not interpret him in this way. It is merely a view which I find myself extracting from his printed words and which I think is important and worth discussing for its own sake.

7 See Place, op. cit., p. 45, near top, and Feigl, op. cit., p. 390, near top.

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ment. All it claims is that in so far as a sensation statement is a report of something, that something is in fact a brain process. Sensations are nothing over and above brain processes. Nations are nothing “over and above” citizens, but this does not prevent the logic of nation statements being very different from the logic of citizen statements, nor does it insure the translatability of nation statements into citizen statements. (I do not, however, wish to assert that the relation of sensation statements to brain- process statements is very like that of nation statements to citizen statements. Nations do not just happen to be nothing over and above citizens, for example. I bring in the “nations” example merely to make a negative point: that the fact that the logic of A-state- ments is different from that of B-statements does not insure that A’s are anything over and above B’s.)

Remarks on identity. When I say that a sensation is a brain process or that lightning is an electric discharge, I am using “is” in the sense of strict identity. (Just as in the-in this case necessary-proposition “7 is identical with the smallest prime number greater than 5.”) When I say that a sensation is a brain process or that lightning is an electric discharge I do not mean just that the sensation is somehow spatially or temporally con- tinuous with the brain process or that the lightning is just spatially or temporally continuous with the discharge. When on the other hand I say that the successful general is the same person as the small boy who stole the apples I mean only that the successful general I see before me is a time slice8 of the same four-dimensional object of which the small boy stealing apples is an earlier time slice. However, the four-dimensional object which has the general-I-see-before-me for its late time slice is identical in the strict sense with the four-dimensional object which has the small- boy-stealing-apples for an early time slice. I distinguish these two senses of “is identical with” because I wish to make it clear that the brain-process doctrine asserts identity in the strict sense.

I shall now discuss various possible objections to the view that

8 See J. H. Woodger, Theory Construction (Chicago, I939), p. 38 (Internation- al Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. 2, No. 5). I here permit myself to speak loosely. For warnings against possible ways of going wrong with this sort of talk, see my note “Spatialising Time,” Mind, LXIV (I955), 239-41.

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the processes reported in sensation statements are in fact processes in the brain. Most of us have met some of these objections in our first year as philosophy students. All the more reason to take a good look at them. Others of the objections will be more recondite and subtle.

Objection l. Any illiterate peasant can talk perfectly well about his after-images, or how things look or feel to him, or about his aches and pains, and yet he may know nothing whatever about neurophysiology. A man may, like Aristotle, believe that the brain is an organ for cooling the body without any impairment of his ability to make true statements about his sensations. Hence the things we are talking about when we describe our sensations cannot be processes in the brain.

Reply. You might as well say that a nation of slug-abeds, who never saw the morning star or knew of its existence, or who had never thought of the expression “the Morning Star,” but who used the expression “the Evening Star” perfectly well, could not use this expression to refer to the same entity as we refer to (and describe as) “the Morning Star.”9

You may object that the Morning Star is in a sense not the very same thing as the Evening Star, but only something spatio- temporally continuous with it. That is, you may say that the Morning Star is not the Evening Star in the strict sense of “identity” that I distinguished earlier. I can perhaps forestall this objection by considering the slug-abeds to be New Zealanders and the early risers to be Englishmen. Then the thing the New Zealanders describe as “the Morning Star” could be the very same thing (in the strict sense) as the Englishmen describe as “the Evening Star.” And yet they could be ignorant of this fact.

There is, however, a more plausible example. Consider lightning.10 Modern physical science tells us that lightning is a certain kind of electrical discharge due to ionization of clouds of water-vapor in the atmosphere. This, it is now believed, is what the true nature of lightning is. Note that there are not two things: a flash of lightning and an electrical discharge. There is one thing, a flash of lightning, which is described scientifically

9 Cf. Feigl, op. cit., p. 439. 10 See Place, op. cit., p. 47; also Feigl, op. cit., p. 438.

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as an electrical discharge to the earth from a cloud of ionized water-molecules. The case is not at all like that of explaining a footprint by reference to a burglar. We say that what lightning really is, what its true nature as revealed by science is, is an electric discharge. (It is not the true nature of a footprint to be a burglar.)

To forestall irrelevant objections, I should like to make it clear that by “lightning” I mean the publicly observable physical object, lightning, not a visual sense-datum of lightning. I say that the publicly observable physical object lightning is in fact the electric discharge, not just a correlate of it. The sense-datum, or at least the having of the sense-datum, the “look” of lightning, may well in my view be a correlate of the electric discharge. For in my view it is a brain state caused by the lightning. But we should no more confuse sensations of lightning with lightning than we confuse sensations of a table with the table.

In short, the reply to Objection i is that there can be contingent statements of the form “A is identical with B,” and a person may well know that something is an A without knowing that it is a B. An illiterate peasant might well be able to talk about his sensations without knowing about his brain processes, just as he can talk about lightning though he knows nothing of electricity.

Objection 2. It is only a contingent fact (if it is a fact) that when we have a certain kind of sensation there is a certain kind of process in our brain. Indeed it is possible, though perhaps in the highest degree unlikely, that our present physiological theories will be as out of date as the ancient theory connecting mental processes with goings on in the heart. It follows that when we report a sensation we are not reporting a brain-process.

Reply. The objection certainly proves that when we say “I have an after-image” we cannot mean something of the form “I have such and such a brain-process.” But this does not show that whatwe report (having an after-image) is not infant a brain process. “I see lightning” does not mean “I see an electric discharge.” Indeed, it is logically possible (though highly unlikely) that the electrical discharge account of lightning might one day be given up. Again, “I see the Evening Star” does not mean the same as “I see the Morning Star,” and yet “the Evening Star and the Morning Star are one and the same thing” is a contingent

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proposition. Possibly Objection 2 derives some of its apparent strength from a “Fido”-Fido theory of meaning. If the meaning of an expression were what the expression named, then of course it would follow from the fact that “sensation” and “brain-process” have different meanings that they cannot name one and the same thing.

Objection 3.11 Even if Objections i and 2 do not prove that sensations are something over and above brain-processes, they do prove that the qualities of sensations are something over and above the qualities of brain-processes. That is, it may be possible to get out of asserting the existence of irreducibly psychic processes, but not out of asserting the existence of irreducibly psychic properties. For suppose we identify the Morning Star with the Evening Star. Then there must be some properties which logically imply that of being the Morning Star, and quite distinct properties. which entail that of being the Evening Star. Again, there must be some properties (for example, that of being a yellow flash) which are logically distinct from those in the physicalist story.

Indeed, it might be thought that the objection succeeds at one jump. For consider the property of “being a yellow flash.” It might seem that this property lies inevitably outside the physicalist framework within which I am trying to work (either by “yellow” being an objective emergent property of physical objects, or else by being a power to produce yellow sense-data, where “yellow,” in this second instantiation of the word, refers to a purely phenom- enal or introspectible quality). I must therefore digress for a moment and indicate how I deal with secondary qualities. I shall concentrate on color.

First of all, let me introduce the concept of a normal percipient. One person is more a normal percipient than another if he can make color discriminations that the other cannot. For example, if A can pick a lettuce leaf out of a heap of cabbage leaves, whereas B cannot though he can pick a lettuce leaf out of a heap of beetroot leaves, then A is more normal than B. (I am assuming that A and B are not given time to distinguish the

Il I think this objection was first put to me by Professor Max Black. I think it is the most subtle of any of those I have considered, and the one which I am least confident of having satisfactorily met.

148

 

 

SENSATIONS AND JRAIN PROCESSES

leaves by their slight difference in shape, and so forth.) From the concept of “more normal than” it is easy to see how we can introduce the concept of “normal.” Of course, Eskimos may make the finest discriminations at the blue end of the spectrum, Hotten- tots at the red end. In this case the concept of a normal percipient is a slightly idealized one, rather like that of “the mean sun” in astronomical chronology. There is no need to go into such subtleties now. I say that “This is red” means something roughly like “A normal percipient would not easily pick this out of a clump of geranium petals though he would pick it out of a clump of lettuce leaves.” Of course it does not exactly mean this: a person might know the meaning of “red” without knowing anything about geraniums, or even about normal percipients. But the point is that a person can be trained to say “This is red” of objects which would not easily be picked out of geranium petals by a normal percipient, and so on. (Note that even a color-blind person can reasonably assert that something is red, though of course he needs to use another human being, not just himself, as his “color meter.”) This account of secondary qualities explains their unimportance in physics. For obviously the discriminations and lack of discriminations made by a very complex neurophysiological mechanism are hardly likely to correspond to simple and nonarbitrary distinctions in nature.

I therefore elucidate colors as powers, in Locke’s sense, to evoke certain sorts of discriminatory responses in human beings. They are also, of course, powers to cause sensations in human beings (an account still nearer Locke’s). But these sensations, I am arguing, are identifiable with brain processes.

Now how do I get over the objection that a sensation can be identified with a brain process only if it has some phenomenal property, not possessed by brain processes, whereby one-half of the identification may be, so to speak, pinned down?

My suggestion is as follows. When a person says, “I see a yel- lowish-orange after-image,” he is saying something like this: “There is something going on which is like what is going on when I have my eyes open, am awake, and there is an orange illuminated in good light in front of me, that is, when I really see an orange.” (And there is no reason why a person should not say the same

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The Philosophy of Motion Pictures

The Philosophy of Motion Pictures

 

 

Foundat ions o f t h e P h i l o s o p h y o f t h e Arts Series Editor: Philip Alperson, Temple University

The Foundations of the Philosophy of the Arts series is designed to provide a comprehensive but flexible series of concise texts addressing both fundamental general questions about art as well as questions about the several arts (literature, film, music, painting, etc.) and the various kinds and dimensions of artistic practice.

A consistent approach across the series provides a crisp, contemporary introduction to the main topics in each area of the arts, written in a clear and accessible style that provides a responsible, comprehensive, and informative account of the relevant issues, reflecting classic and recent work in the field. Books in the series are writ ten by a truly distinguished roster of philosophers with international renown.

1. The Philosophy of Art, Stephen Davies 2. The Philosophy of Motion Pictures, Noel Carroll

Forthcoming: The Philosophy of Literature, Peter Lamarque The Philosophy of Music, Philip Alperson Black is Beautiful: A Philosophy of Black Aesthetics, Paul Taylor

 

 

The Philosophy of Motion Pictures

Noel Carroll

jfk Blackwell * C r Publishing

 

 

© 2008 by Noel Carroll

BLACKWELL PUBLISHING 350 Main Street, Maiden, MA 02148-5020, USA 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK 550 Swanston Street, Carlton, Victoria 3053, Australia

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First published 2008 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd

1 2008

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-?ublication Data

Carroll, Noel, 1947- The philosophy of motion pictures / Noel Carroll.

p. cm. — (Foundations of the philosophy of the arts) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4051-2024-1 (hardcover : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-1-4051-2025-8 (pbk. : alk. paper)

1. Motion pictures—Philosophy. I. Title. PN1995.C3574 2008 791.4301—dc22

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For further information on Blackwell Publishing, visit our website at www.blackwellpublishing.com

 

 

To Loretta and Maureen for taking care of my brothers

 

 

 

Contents

Acknowledgments viii

Introduction: From Film Theory to the Philosophy

of the Moving Image 1

1 Film as Art 7

2 Medium Specificity 35

3 What Is Cinema? 53

4 The Moving Picture — the Shot 80

5 Moving Images — Cinematic Sequencing and Narration 116

6 Affect and the Moving Image 147

7 Evaluation 192

Select Bibliography 227 Index 233

 

 

Acknowledgments

The author would like to acknowledge the helpful comments, criticisms, and suggestions offered in the preparation of parts of this book by Philip Alperson, Susan Feagin, Margaret Moore, Jonathan Frome, Vitor Moura, Jinhee Choi, Murray Smith, Gregory Currie, Aaron Smuts, Tom Wartenberg, Cynthia Freeland, Annette Michelson, Jeff Dean/ George Wilson, Elisa Galgut, Ward Jones, Amy Coplan, Patrick Keating, and Deborah Knight. They helped make this a better book. I’m the one who made it worse.

 

 

Introduction

From Film Theory to the Philosophy of the

Moving Image

Though the philosophy of the motion picture — or, as I prefer to say, the moving image — began early in the twentieth century, perhaps arguably with the publication in 1916 of The Photoplay: A Psychological Study by Hugo Munsterberg (a Harvard professor of philosophy and psychology in the department of William James), the philosophy of motion pictures did not become a thriving sub-field of philosophy until quite recently. Although Ludwig Wittgenstein enjoyed movies and attended them often — he especially liked westerns — he did not philosophize about them. But as of late, the discussion of movies by philosophers has become quite literally volurninous.

Why? At least two factors may account for this, one demographic and the

other intellectual. The demographic consideration is this: for the philosophy of motion

pictures to take root in any serious way, a substantial cadre of philosophers steeped in motion pictures was necessary in order for a deep and informed philosophical conversation to be sustained. Historically speaking, that condition did not begin to be satisfied sufficiently until the late 1960s and 1970s. By then there was at least one generation of philosophers who had grown up going to the movies in their neighborhood playhouses, and also a second generation who had access, through television, to a wide selection of the history of their own national and/or regional cinema

See for example the bibliography assembled by Jinhee Choi in Philosophy of Film and Motion Pictures, edited by Noel Carroll and Jinhee Choi (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006).

 

 

2 FROM THEORY TO PHILOSOPHY

traditions. Thus, toward the end of the twentieth century there were — suddenly — enough philosophers with enough knowledge about motion pictures for rich and wide-ranging philosophical debates to begin and for positions to be refined dialectically.

The demographic situation that I’ve just described, of course, not only explains the emergence of the field of the philosophy of motion pictures. It also accounts for the evolution of cinema studies (or moving image studies, or just media studies) as a rapidly expanding academic enterprise. However, though cinema scholars initially followed in the footsteps of the major film theorists (such as Rudolf Arnheim, Sergei Eisenstein, V. I. Pudovin, Andre Bazin, and Siegfried Kracauer, among others), by the 1980s cinema studies, like other branches of the humanities, took what has come to be called “the cultural or social turn.” That is, academics in cinema studies decided to reorient their field in the direction of what came to be known as “cultural studies.” And in doing so, they left in mid-air many of the discussions of a lot of the issues that had perplexed earlier film theorists.

Intellectually, a vacuum appeared. And as Richard Allen, a former chairperson of the New York University Department of Cinema Studies, has pointed out, philosophers stepped into that gap. In effect, the professors of cinema studies have ceded what was once a central part of their field to philosophers of the moving image.

Perhaps needless to say, the philosophical appropriation of many of the topics of the earlier film theorists is by no means a matter of an alien colonization. For traditional film theory was always mixed through and through with philosophy. For example, to take a position on whether film is or is not art presupposes a philosophy of art. Film theorists also helped themselves to theses from many other branches of philosophy as well. Philosophy was never far from the thinking of classical film theorists. So, in this respect, the philosophy of the moving image is a legitimate heir to film theory, and not a usurper.

Many of the topics in this book — especially in terms of the questions asked — reflect the legacy of traditional film theory for the contemporary philosophy of the moving image. The first chapter addresses the question of whether or not film can be art. This is undoubtedly the question that got film theory and the philosophy of the motion pictures rolling in the early decades of the twentieth century. As we shall see, the issue has been revived of late due to some recent, highly sophisticated theories about the nature of photography. As in the past, showing that film can be an art forces us to look at and think closely about the nature of our object of study. In this way, meeting the charge that film is somehow precluded from

 

 

FROM THEORY TO PHILOSOPHY 3

the order of art in fact becomes an opportunity to deepen our understanding of the moving image.

The second chapter concerns what can be called the “medium specificity thesis.” This is the view that the artistic exploration of cinematic possibi­ lities must follow the implicit directives of the medium in which those possibilities are realized. The precise medium that figures in debates like this is typically film — that is, photographically or celluloid based motion pictures. The claim is that the nature of this medium has normative consequences with regard to that which moviemakers should pursue and avoid in their artistic endeavors. Quite simply, it is argued, they should strive to be cinematic and shun being un-cinematic (a condition that is often also equated with being theatrical). Because this was an article of faith for so long in the history of film and because the position appeals so seductively to common sense, it is worth a chapter to scrutinize the medium specificity hypothesis in depth.

Chapter 3 focuses on the question, “What is cinema?” The title, of course, comes from the legendary collection of essays by Andre Bazin, one of the most renowned theorists in the history of the moving image. It probably goes without saying that nearly every major film theorist has organized his or her thinking about cinema around this question.

In this chapter, I defend the notion that cinema is best understood in terms of the category of the moving image. “The moving image?” you might ask: “In contrast to what?” The short answer is: in contrast to film — that is, to be more explicit, in contrast to celluloidTmounted, photographi­ cally based film. I will argue that our object of study here is more fruitfully conceptualized under the broader category of the moving image than it is under the rubric of film, narrowly construed.

Film, properly so called, was undoubtedly the most important early implementation of the moving image (a.k.a. movies), but the impression of movement — including moving pictures and moving stories — can be realized in many other media including kinetoscopes, video, broadcast TV, GGI, and technologies not yet even imagined. Of course, ordinary folks don’t haggle over whether a videocassette is a movie or not. And neither, I will argue, should philosophers.

This, of course, is a conceptual point. It is not my intention to initiate a crusade for linguistic reform. That would be quixotic. In everyday speech, many use the labelfilm to designate things that are really the product of other media. For example, they may refer to a high-definition video as a film.

This is rather like the use of the name “Coke” for any cola, or “Xerox” for any copying machine, or “Levi” for all jeans, or “zipper” for every slide

 

 

4 FROM THEORY TO PHILOSOPHY

fastener. In these cases, the names of the earliest, most popular entrants to a field get used — in an inaccurate way, strictly speaking — to refer to their successors and even their competitors. Because of this tendency, we under­ stand why sometimes digital cinematography will get called film, though it does not involve the use of film (i.e., the use of a filmstrip). There is little damage here in the daily course of events. Nevertheless, as we shall see, it can and does cause philosophical mischief.

Chapter 4 follows the discussion of the nature of cinema with an analysis of the nature of the cinematic image, construed as a single shot. Obviously, these two topics are related, if only because throughout the history of motion pictures, the temptation has endured to treat movies as if they were equivalent to photographs, where photographs, in turn, are conceived of as modeling single shots.* That is, many have attempted to extrapolate the nature of cinema tout court from the nature of the photographic shot. Thus, it is imperative for the philosopher of the moving image to get straight about the nature of the shot.

Of course, typical motion pictures, excluding experiments like Andy WarhoFs Empire, are usually more than one shot in length. Shots are characteristically strung together in cinematic sequences, usually by means of editing. Chapter 5 examines prevailing structures of cinematic sequencing from a functional point of view. In this regard, one might see the analysis here as returning to an exploration of the terrain that was of the greatest interest to the montage theorists of the Soviet period.

Moreover, in composing the image series in a motion picture, one not only standardly combines shots to construct sequences but then also joins sequences to build whole movies. Consequently, in the second part of chapter 5 we turn to the most common way of connecting sequences to make popular, mass-market movies — a process that we call erotetic narra­ tion, that is, a method of generating stories by means of questions the narrator implicitly promises to answer.

Just as chapter 5 revisits, with a difference, the concerns of the monta- gists, so chapter 6 also tackles a subject near and dear to the heart of Sergei Eisenstein — the way in which cinema addresses feeling. Unlike Eisenstein, however, in this chapter I will take advantage of recent refinements in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science in order to appreciate the wide gamut of ways in which movies can engage our affective reactions. I will try

For example, we call an afternoon photographing fashion models “a shoot” and a successful photo a “nice shot.”

 

 

FROM THEORY TO PHILOSOPHY 5

to be precise where Eisenstein was often impressionistic. Nevertheless, at the end of the chapter, I will attempt to argue that at least one of Eisenstein’s insights into the mechanics of influencing audience affect was spot-on. These audience responses are what we can call mirror reflexes; and Eisenstein was dead right about their significance.

The last chapter in the book focuses on the evaluation of motion pictures. Though many might be tempted to maintain that they are wholly a subjective affair, I will try to demonstrate that quite often movie evaluations can be shown to be rational and objective. Often, this relies upon determining the category in which the movie under discussion is to be correctly classified. Since more than one category comes into play when evaluating the range of available motion pictures, the position defended in our last chapter is called the pluralistic-category approach.

The pluralistic-category approach contrasts sharply with traditional approaches which attempt to identify a single category — often called the cinematic — into which all movies allegedly fall and in accordance with which all motion pictures can be evaluated. The pluralistic-category approach, instead, accepts that there are many categories of motion pictures — from comedies and splatter films to travelogues and onto instructional videos about install­ ing software or wearing condoms — and that, inasmuch as specimens of these different categories are designed to fulfill different functions, they call forth different criteria of evaluation.

In the past, the theory (or philosophy) of cinema was often pursued in a very top-down manner. One identified the essence of cinema — usually understood in terms of photographic film — and then attempted to deduce accounts of every other feature of film on the basis of that essence.

The conception of the moving image championed in this book is much looser. Although I attempt to define the moving image, I do so in a way that remains wide open not only to the media in which moving images may be realized, but also in terms of the purposes moving images may legitimately serve. Our characterizations of the elements of the moving image — the shot, the sequence, the erotetic narrative, and its modes of affective address — are not deduced from first principles. Rather, we proceed from topic to topic in a piecemeal fashion.

Thus, the end product is in nowise as unified as the philosophies of our very distinguished predecessors in film theory. Instead, our results are pluralistic. Nevertheless, that appears to be where the argument leads us.

Of course, whether or not that is really so is for you to decide. Therefore, read on.

 

 

b FROM THEORY TO PHILOSOPHY

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n Defense of Mind-Body-Dualism,

In “Sensations and Brain Processes” J.J.C. Smart considers the following objection to the identity thesis: “I can imagine myself turned to stone and yet having images, aches, pains, and so on” (152). In her essay “In Defense of Mind-Body-Dualism,” Brie Gertler transforms this objection into an argument for dualism.

In a double-spaced, 750-word paper, explain:

  • how Smart responds to this objection (Tip: focus on the first paragraph of his reply to objection 7);
  • how Brie Gertler addresses Smart’s objection to conceivability arguments in revising premise 2 and premise 1 of her argument for dualism. (Tip: most of your paper should be spent on this)

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What do you think is an example of Socrates pursuing such a question in the Defense?

Beardsley and Beardsley offer that philosophical questions have at least two properties, they are general, and they are fundamental. What do you think is an example of Socrates pursuing such a question in the Defense? What makes the question general? What makes it fundamental?

 

A philosophy of education is a statement regarding your beliefs and values about education.

A philosophy of education is a statement regarding your beliefs and values about education. This statement is often required as part of the application process in gaining employment as a teacher.

Write a 500-750 word statement of your educational philosophy using the results of your “Professional Dispositions Self-Assessment Survey.” Your philosophy may be grounded in a theory or theories that you have studied in this course, or informed by your study of historical and sociological influences on education.

In your statement, include your beliefs and values in each of the following areas:

  • The purpose of education
  • Vision of a commitment to collaboration in promoting the growth and development of young children
  • The role of the teacher as a leader and advocate according to some of the ethical frameworks that you have examined
  • The process of self-reflecting on teaching practices and education policy in order to utilize research, ethical practice, and other resources to advance the profession

Include three scholarly references to support your philosophy of education.

Theoretical background/Literature review

The purpose of this assignment is to give you a chance to synthesize theories and research findings in

SLD to come up with a research proposal. Your research proposal should include the following

components:

(1) Introduction (2) Theoretical background/Literature review:

In this section, you will provide the theoretical and empirical background of your study. You

should discuss at least 5 primary research studies. Based on this discussion/review of

previous research, you will demonstrate the need for your proposed study. If relevant, you

may include the 3 research studies you reviewed in Project #2.

(3) Research question(s): State the research question(s) that you will address in your proposed research.

(4) Methods: Provide a description of the methods that you will use to gather data and answer your

research questions. You may choose a quantitative, qualitative, or mixed methods design.

Also include a brief description of how you plan to analyze the data. Also state your expected

findings.

The paper should be 8-10 pages (excluding references), doubled-spaced, 12-point font, standard

margins. It should follow APA format. The due date is May 5th. Submit your assignment in WORD

format (not pdf) through Canvas by midnight.

 

Evaluation will be based on:

a) Content ▪ The purpose of the study is stated clearly with sufficient explanation for the need to

conduct the proposed study.

▪ At least five relevant previous studies are selected and sufficiently discussed in connection with the overall proposed study.

▪ The research questions have been stated clearly and can be answered through the study. (They are not too ambitious to the point that they cannot be answered through the study.)

▪ The methods selected are appropriate for answering the research questions. The methods to be used are explained in sufficient detail.

▪ The plans for data analysis and the expected findings are clearly stated. b) Organization

▪ The paper is written in a logical order. ▪ The transition between ideas is clear so that the paper is easy to follow.

c) Writing/format ▪ The overall writing of the paper is clear. ▪ The paper follows the required format.

 

Some additional resources that may be helpful:

➢ Quantitative research guidelines: https://www.tesol.org/read-and-publish/journals/tesol- quarterly/tesol-quarterly-research-guidelines/quantitative-research-guidelines

➢ Qualitative research-Case study guidelines: https://www.tesol.org/read-and- publish/journals/tesol-quarterly/tesol-quarterly-research-guidelines/qualitative-research-case-

Summarizing Methods Used In Linguistics

Summarizing Methods Used In Linguistics

Choose 5 articles/researches in ” LINGUISTICS ” , summarizing the methods they use , such as ” interviews , questioners , open-ended , case study , texts  , etc.”

WRITE 2 PAGES OF THE METHODS  USED IN THESE 5 ARTICLES/RESEARCHES.

pragmatics is part of linguistics

write 3 theses topics in ” PRAGMATICS” with brief ” pragmatics is part of linguistics”

and please find something researchable that I can collect data about it , and i will make it in JORDAN

* if one of them were in speech act — many people I know in my university wrote about one of them so I need something unique that I will find no one ever wrote about it”

Lexeme formation: the familiar

Lexeme formation: the familiar 39

3. Some speakers will fi nd the forms in (3b) odd, and will question their acceptability, but they are all attested

in the Corpus of Contemporary American English and discussed in Bauer, Lieber, and Plag ( 2013 ).

goes on. This morpheme (an a for the verb ‘love’ and an i for the verb ‘say’)

doesn’t mean anything, but still must be added before the inflectional

ending can be attached. The root plus this extra morpheme is the stem .

Thought of another way, the stem is usually the base that is left when the

inflectional endings are removed. We will look further at roots and stems

in Chapter 6 , when we discuss inflection more fully.

3.3 Affixation

3.3.1 Word formation rules Let’s look more carefully at words derived by affixation . Prefixes and suf-

fixes usually have special requirements for the sorts of bases they can

attach to. Some of these requirements concern the phonology (sounds) of

their bases, and others concern the semantics (meaning) of their bases –

we will return to these shortly – but the most basic requirements are often

the syntactic part of speech or category of their bases. For example, the

suffix -ness attaches freely to adjectives, as the examples in (3a) show and

sometimes to nouns (as in (3b) ), but not to verbs (3c) :

(3) a. – ness on adjectives: redness, happiness, wholeness, commonness,

niceness

b. – ness on nouns: appleness, babeness, couch-potatoness 3

c. – ness on verbs: *runness, *wiggleness, *yawnness

The prefix un- attaches to adjectives (where it means ‘not’) and to verbs

(where it means ‘reverse action’), but not to nouns:

(4) a. un – on adjectives: unhappy, uncommon, unkind, unserious

b. un- on verbs: untie, untwist, undress, unsnap

c. un- on nouns: *unchair, *unidea, *ungiraffe

We might begin to build some of the rules that native speakers of English use

for making words with -ness or un- by stating their categorial requirements:

(5) Rule for -ness (first version): Attach – ness to an adjective or to a noun.

Rule for un- (first version): Attach un- to an adjective or to a verb.

Of course, if we want to be as precise as possible about what native speak-

ers know about forming words with these affixes, we should also indicate

what category of word results from using these affixes, and what the

resulting word means. So a more complete version of our – ness and un-

rules might look like (6) :

(6) Rule for – ness (second version): – ness attaches to adjectives or nouns

‘X’ and produces nouns meaning ‘the quality of X’.

Rule for un- (second version): un- attaches to adjectives meaning ‘X’

and produces adjectives meaning ‘not X’; un – attaches to verbs

meaning ‘X’ and produces verbs meaning ‘reverse the action X’.

 

 

40 INTRODUCING MORPHOLOGY

If we’re really trying to model what native speakers of English know about

these affixes, we might try to be even more precise. For example, un- does

not attach to all adjectives or verbs, as you can discover by looking at the

next Challenge box.

Challenge

Look at the following words and try to work out more details of the

rule for un- in English. The (a) list contains some adjectives to which

negative un- can be attached and others which seem impossible or at

least somewhat odd. The (b) list contains some verbs to which

reversative un- can attach and others which seem impossible. See if

you can discern some patterns:

(a) unhappy, *unsad, unlovely, *unugly, unintelligent, *unstupid

(b) untie, unwind, unhinge, unknot, *undance, *unyawn, *unexplode,

*unpush

What the (a) examples in the Challenge box seem to show is that the negative

prefix un- in English prefers to attach to bases that do not themselves have

negative connotations. This is not true all of the time – adjectives like unself-

ish or unhostile are attested in English – but it’s at least a significant tendency.

As for the (b) examples, they suggest that the un- that attaches to verbs pre-

fers verbal bases that imply some sort of result, and moreover that the result

is not permanent. Verbs like dance, push, and yawn denote actions that have

no results, and although explode implies a result (i.e., something is blown up),

it’s a result that is permanent. In contrast, a verb like tie implies a result

(something is in a bow or knot) which is temporary (you can take it apart).

We have just constructed what morphologists call a word formation

rule , a rule which makes explicit all the categorial, semantic, and phono-

logical information that native speakers know about the kind of base that

an affix attaches to and about the kind of word it creates. We might now

state the full word formation rules for negative un- as in (7) :

(7) Rule for negative un- (final version): un- attaches to adjectives,

preferably those with neutral or positive connotations, and creates

negative adjectives. It has no phonological restrictions.

Now let’s look at two more affixes. In English we can form new verbs by

using the suffixes -ize or -ify . Both of these suffixes attach to either nouns

or adjectives, resulting in verbs:

(8) -ize on adjectives: civilize, idealize, finalize, romanticize,

tranquillize

-ize on nouns: unionize, crystallize, hospitalize, caramelize,

animalize

-ify on adjectives: purify, glorify, uglify, moistify, diversify

– ify on nouns: mummify, speechify, classify, brutify, scarify,

bourgeoisify

 

 

Lexeme formation: the familiar 41

We might state the word formation rules for -ize and -ify as in (9) :

(9) Rule for -ize (first version): -ize attaches to adjectives or nouns that

mean ‘X’ and produces verbs that mean ‘make/put into X’.

Rule for -ify (first version): -ify attaches to adjectives or nouns that

mean ‘X’ and produces verbs that mean ‘make/put into X’.

But again, we can be a bit more precise about these rules. Although -ize

and -ify have almost identical requirements for the category of base they

attach to and produce words with roughly the same meaning, they have

somewhat different requirements on the phonological form of the stem

they attach to. As the examples in (8) show, -ize prefers words with two or

more syllables where the final syllable doesn’t bear primary stress (e.g.,

trá nquil, hó spital ). The suffix -ify , on the other hand, prefers monosyllabic

bases ( pure, brute, scar ), although it also attaches to bases that end in a – y

( mummy, ugly ) or bases whose final syllables are stressed ( divé rse, bourgé ois ).

Since we want to be as precise as possible about our word formation rules

for these suffixes, we will state their phonological restrictions along with

their categorial needs:

(10) Rule for -ize (final version): -ize attaches to adjectives or nouns of

two or more syllables where the final syllable does not bear

primary stress. For a base ‘X’ it produces verbs that mean ‘make/put

into X’.

I leave it to you to come up with the final version of the word formation

rule for – ify.

3.3.2 Word structure When you divide up a complex word into its morphemes, as in (11) , it’s

easy to get the impression that words are put together like the beads that

make up a necklace – one after the other in a line:

(11) unhappiness = un + happy + ness

But morphologists believe that words are more like onions than like neck-

laces: onions are made up of layers from innermost to outermost. Consider

a word like unhappiness . We can break this down into its component mor-

phemes un + happy + ness , but given what we learned above about the

properties of the prefix un- and the suffix – ness we know something more

about the way in which this word is constructed beyond just its constitu-

ent parts. We know that un- must first go on the base happy . Happy is an

adjective, and un- attaches to adjectives but does not change their catego-

ry. The suffix -ness attaches only to adjectives and makes them into nouns.

So if un- attaches first to happy and -ness attaches next, the requirements

of both affixes are met. But if we were to do it the other way around, -ness

would have first created a noun, and then un- would be unable to attach.

We could represent the order of attachment as if words really were

onions, with the base in the innermost layer, and each affix in its own

succeeding layer: see Figure 3.2 .

 

 

42 INTRODUCING MORPHOLOGY

But linguists, not generally being particularly artistic, prefer to show

these relationships as ‘trees’ that look like this :

(12)

 

N

A

A

un happy ness

Similarly, we might represent the structure of a word like repurify as in (13) :

(13)

 

V

V

A

re pure ify

In order to draw this structure, we must first know that the prefix re-

attaches to verbs (e.g., reheat, rewash , or redo ) but not to adjectives ( *repure,

*rehappy ) or to nouns ( *rechair, *retruth ). Once we know this, we can say that

the adjective pure must first be made into a verb by suffixing -ify , and only

then can re- attach to it.

FIGURE 3.2 Words are like onions

Challenge

In English, the suffix -ize attaches to nouns or adjectives to form

verbs. The suffix -ation attaches to verbs to form nouns. And the suffix

-al attaches to nouns to form adjectives. Interestingly, these suffixes

 

 

Lexeme formation: the familiar 43

3.3.3 What do affixes mean? When we made the distinction between affixes and bound bases above, we

did so on the basis of a rather vague notion of semantic robustness; bound

bases in some sense had more meat to them than affixes did. Let us now

attempt to make that idea a bit more precise by looking at typical mean-

ings of affixes.

In some cases, affixes seem to have not much meaning at all. Consider

the suffixes in (14) :

(14) a. -(a)tion examination, taxation, realization, construction

– ment agreement, placement, advancement, postponement

-al refusal, arousal, disposal

b. -ity purity, density, diversity, complexity

-ness happiness, thickness, rudeness, sadness

Beyond turning verbs into nouns with meanings like ‘process of X-ing’ or

‘result of X-ing’, where X is the meaning of the verb, it’s not clear that the

suffixes -(a)tion, -ment , and -al add much of any meaning at all. Similarly

with -ity and -ness , these don’t carry much semantic weight of their own,

aside from what comes with turning adjectives into nouns that mean

something like ‘the abstract quality of X’, where X is the base adjective.

Affixes like these are sometimes called transpositional affixes , meaning

that their primary function is to change the category of their base with-

out adding any extra meaning.

Contrast these, however, with affixes like those in (15) :

(15) a. -ee employee, recruitee, deportee, inductee

b. -less shoeless, treeless, rainless, supperless

c. re- reheat, reread, rewash

These affixes seem to have more semantic meat on their bones, so to

speak: -ee on a verb indicates a person who undergoes an action; -less

means something like ‘without’; and re- means something like ‘again’.

Languages frequently have affixes (or other morphological processes, as

we’ll see in Chapter 5 ) that fall into common semantic categories. Among

those categories are:

• personal or participant affixes: These are affixes that create ‘people nouns’ either from verbs or from nouns. Among the personal affixes

in English are the suffix -er which forms agent nouns (the ‘doer’ of

can be attached in a recursive fashion: convene → convention →

conventional → conventionalize → conventionalization .

First draw a word tree for conventionalization . Then see if you can

find other bases on which you can attach these suffixes recursively.

What is the most complex word you can create from a single base

that still makes sense to you? Are there any limits to the complexity

of words derived in this way?

 

 

44 INTRODUCING MORPHOLOGY

the action) like writer or runner and the suffix -ee which forms patient

nouns (the person the action is done to). Also among this class of

affixes are ones that create other ‘people nouns’ other than the agent

or the patient in an event, for example, inhabitants of a place (like

Manhattanite or Bostonian ).

• locative affixes: These are affixes that designate a place. For example, in English we can use the suffix – ery or – age to denote a place where

something is done or gathered (like eatery or orphanage ).

• abstract affixes: These are affixes that create abstract nouns that denote qualities (like happiness or purity ) or statuses ( puppydom, advisor-

ship, daddyhood ) or even aspects of behavior ( buffoonery ).

• negative and privative affixes: Negative affixes add the meaning ‘not’ to their base; examples in English are the prefixes un- , in- , and non-

( unhappy, inattentive, non-functional ). Privative affixes mean something

like ‘without X’; in English, the suffix -less ( shoeless, hopeless ) is a priva-

tive suffix, and the prefix de- has a privative flavor as well (e.g., words

like debug or debone mean something like ‘cause to be without bugs/

bones’).

• prepositional and relational affixes: Prepositional and relational affixes often convey notions of space and/or time. Examples in

English might be prefixes like over- and out- or pre – and post – ( overfill,

overcoat, outrun, outhouse, preschool, preheat, postwar, postdate ).

• quantitative affixes: These are affixes that have something to do with amount. In English we have affixes like -ful ( handful, helpful )

and multi – ( multifaceted ). Another example might be the prefix re-

that means ‘repeated’ action ( reread ), which we can consider quan-

titative if we conceive of a repeated action as being done more

than once. Other quantitative affixes that we have in English

denote collectives or aggregates of individuals (e.g., acreage or

knickknackery ).

• evaluative affixes: Evaluative affixes consist of diminutives , affixes that signal a smaller version of the base (e.g., in English -let as in

booklet or droplet ) and augmentatives , affixes that signal a bigger ver-

sion of the base. The closest we come to augmentative affixes in

English are prefixes like mega- ( megastore , megabite ). The Native

American language Tuscarora (Iroquoian family) has an augmenta-

tive suffix – ʔ o ʔ y that can be added to nouns to mean ‘a big X’; for

example, takó:θ- ʔ o ʔ y means ‘a big cat’ (Williams 1976 : 233). Diminutives and augmentatives frequently bear other nuances of

meaning. For example, diminutives often convey affection, or

endearment, as we find in some words with – y or – ie in English (e.g.,

sweetie, kitty ). Augmentatives sometimes have pejorative overtones

(the Niger-Congo language Fula has a pejorative diminutive, for

example).

Note that some semantically contentful affixes change syntactic category

as well; for example, the suffixes -er and -ee change verbs to nouns, and the

prefix de- changes nouns to verbs. But semantically contentful affixes

 

 

Lexeme formation: the familiar 45

need not change syntactic category. The suffixes – hood and -dom , for

example, do not ( childhood, kingdom ), and by and large prefixes in English

do not change syntactic category.

So far we have been looking at suffixes and prefixes whose meanings

seem to be relatively clear. Things are not always so simple, though. Let’s

look more closely at the suffix -er in English, which we said above formed

agent nouns. Consider the following words:

(16) a. writer

skater

b. printer

freighter

c. loaner

fryer (i.e., a kind of chicken)

d. diner

All of these words seem to be formed with the same suffix. Look at each

group of words and try to characterize what their meanings are. Does -er

seem to have a consistent meaning?

It’s rather hard to see what all of these have in common. The words in

(16a) are indeed all agent nouns, but the (b) words are instruments; in

other words, things that do an action. In American English the (c) words

are things as well, but things that undergo the action rather than

doing the action (like the patient -ee words discussed above): a loaner is

something which is loaned (often a car, in the US), and a fryer is some-

thing (a chicken) which is fried. And the word diner in (d) denotes a loca-

tion (a diner in the US is a specific sort of restaurant). Some morphologists

would argue that there are four separate suffixes in English, all with the

form -er . But others think that there’s enough similarity among the

meanings of -er words in all these cases to merit calling -er a single affix,

but one with a cluster of related meanings. All of the forms derived with

-er denote concrete nouns, either persons or things, related to their base

verbs by participating in the action denoted by the verb, although some-

times in different ways. This cluster of related meanings is called affixal

polysemy .

Affixal polysemy is not unusual in the languages of the world. For

example, it is not unusual for agents and instruments to be designated by

the same suffix. This occurs in Dutch , as the examples in (17a) show (Booij

and Lieber 2004 ), but also in Yoruba (Niger-Congo family), as the examples

in (17b) show (Pulleyblank 1987 : 978):

(17) a. Dutch

spel-er ‘player’ ( spelen ‘play’)

Maai-er ‘mower’ ( maaien ‘mow’)

b. Yoruba

a-pànìà ‘murderer’ ( pa ‘kill’, ènìà ‘people’)

a-bẹ ‘razor, penknife’ ( bẹ ‘cut’)

 

 

46 INTRODUCING MORPHOLOGY

The Dutch suffix -er is in fact quite similar to the -er suffix in English in

the range of meanings it can express. The Yoruba prefix a- also forms both

agents and instruments.

3.3.4 To divide or not to divide? A foray into extenders , formatives , crans , and other messy bits In Chapter 1 we defined a morpheme as the smallest unit of language that

has its own meaning. We have now looked at affixes and bases, both free

and bound, and considered their meanings and how they combine into

complex structures. For the most part, the examples we have looked at are

simple and their analysis has been relatively clear. But often the closer we

look at the morphology of a language, the more complex it becomes.

There are many ways we can illustrate this with the morphology of

English , but we will choose just a few points in this section that compli-

cate our initial picture. I should point out in advance that my examples

here will come from English, but we should expect to find similar twists

and turns in any language whose morphology we examine in detail.

Consider the words in (18) :

(18) a. report, import, transport, deport, comport, export

b. cranberry, huckleberry, raspberry

c. Platonic, tobacconist, spasmodic, egotist

d. sniffle, snort, snot, snout

e. eggitarian, pizzatarian, pastatarian, fruitarian, flexitarian

Let’s start with the ones in (18a) . We have assumed so far that words can

be broken down into morphemes, which are pieces that have meaning.

The words in (18a) certainly look like they might be broken down because

they have recurrent parts, but if they are, what do the pieces mean? In

fact, English has dozens of words that are similar to what we might call

the – port family. See how many cells of Table 3.1 you can fill in.

Table 3.1

in- ex- con- re- trans- de-

-port

-mit

-ceive

-duce

-cede

-fer

-scribe

-gress

-sist

 

 

Lexeme formation: the familiar 47

One reason for our dilemma in analyzing these forms is that they are

not native to English. They were borrowed from Latin (or from French ,

which in turn is descended from Latin), where they did have clear mean-

ings: -port comes from the verb portare ‘to carry’, – mit from the verb mittere

‘to send’, -scribe from the verb scribere ‘to write’, and so on. But English

speakers (unless they’ve studied Latin!) don’t know this. Morphologists are

left with an unsatisfying sense that the words above somehow ought to be

treated as complex, but are nevertheless reluctant to give up the strict

definition of morpheme. One way of dealing with these pieces is to

acknowledge that they seem to be independent and recombinable in some

way, but that they are not morphemes in the normal sense. Bauer, Lieber,

and Plag ( 2013 : 16) call elements like these formatives , which they define

as “elements contributing to the construction of words whose semantic

unity or function is obscure or dubious.”

The items in (18b) illustrate a different type of formative that are some-

times called cran morphs , from the first bit of the word cranberry . The

second part of the word cranberry is clearly a free morpheme. But when we

break it off, what’s left is a piece that doesn’t seem to occur in other words

(except in recent years, words like cranapple that are part of product

names), and doesn’t seem to mean anything independently. There are

quite a few of these cran morphs in the names of other types of berries:

rasp- in raspberry , huckle- in huckleberry . In cases such as these we are even

more tempted than we were with – port, -ceive , and the like to divide words

into morphemes, even though we know that one part of the word isn’t

meaningful in the way morphemes usually are.

The examples in (18c) also display a puzzling characteristic. If we try to

break these words down into their component morphemes, what we find

is that each one consists of two obvious morphemes plus an extra sound

or two:

(19) Plato + n + ic (compare icon+ic )

tobacco + n + ist (compare accordian+ist )

spasm + od + ic (compare Celt+ic )

ego + t+ ist (compare clarinet+ist )

The question is what the extra bit is. Is it part of the base of the word or part

of the affix or part of neither? It seems pretty clear that it doesn’t mean

anything. And why do we get an / n / in Platonic , but / od / in spasmodic , and noth-

ing between the base and the suffix in heroic , or an /n/ in tobacconist , but a /t/

in egotist ? Morphologists don’t have a clear answer to these questions – part

Challenge

Do you think that units like -port, -mit, -ceive , and the like should be

considered morphemes? If so, what problems do they present for our

definition of morpheme ? If not, what should we do about the

intuition that native speakers of English have that such words are

complex?

 

 

48 INTRODUCING MORPHOLOGY

of the fun of doing morphology is that we can argue about the possibilities,

after all! – but we can at least give these puzzling bits a name. Following

Bauer, Lieber, and Plag ( 2013 ), we will call them extenders .

Next, let’s look at the examples in (18d) . These exhibit what is called

sound symbolism . All of the words begin with the consonant cluster /sn/

and seem to have something to do with the nose, but the sequence of

sounds /sn/ doesn’t mean anything by itself. Here morphologists are rela-

tively agreed that sound symbolic words cannot be broken into parts. For

one thing, the sequence /sn/ doesn’t refer to ‘nose’ everywhere it occurs

(consider words like snail, snap , or snit ), and for another, if we were to seg-

ment /sn/ in the words in (18) , what would be left over would neither have

meaning by itself nor recur elsewhere in English.

Our final group of odd bits is illustrated in (18e) . In these examples, the

first part of each word is clearly a free morpheme, but the second part is

not. Rather, it is what Bauer, Lieber, and Plag ( 2013 ) call a splinter ,

something which is split off from an original word, but which is not

really (yet!) a true suffix. In the examples in (18e) , the splinter is tarian ,

which is a bit broken off from the word vegetarian , and then used to create

new words meaning ‘one who eats X’. English has lots of splinters, among

them tastic , as in funktastic or fishtastic , which is used to form mostly ironic

words meaning ‘excellent or great in reference to X’, originally from fan-

tastic , or licious , as in bagelicious or bootielicious , which is used to form words

meaning ‘appealing in reference to X’, originally from the word delicious .

The difference between a splinter and a true suffix is that speakers under-

stand splinters in relation to the original word from which the ending

splits off. If these bits survive and continue to give rise to new forms,

though, they might someday be real suffixes!

3.4 Compounding

So far we have concentrated on complex words formed by derivation, spe-

cifically by affixation. Derivation is not the only way of forming new

words, of course. Many languages also form words by a process called

compounding. Compounds are words that are composed of two (or more)

bases, roots, or stems. In English we generally use free bases to compose

compounds, as the examples in (20) show:

(20) English compounds

compounds of two nouns: windmill, dog bed, book store

compounds of two adjectives: icy cold, blue-green, red hot

compounds of an adjective and a noun: greenhouse, blackboard,

hard hat

compounds of a noun and an adjective: sky blue, cherry red, rock hard

3.4.1 When do we have a compound? How do we know that a sequence of words is a compound? Surprisingly,

it’s not that easy to come up with a single criterion that works in all cases.

 

  • 3 Lexeme formation: the familiar
    • 3.3 Affixation
      • 3.3.1 Word formation rules
      • 3.3.2 Word structure
      • 3.3.3 What do affixes mean?
      • 3.3.4 To divide or not to divide? A foray into extenders, formatives, crans, and other messy bits
    • 3.4 Compounding
      • 3.4.1 When do we have a compound?