Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
THE
Chinese Must Go
THE
Chinese Must Go VIO LENCE, EXCLUSION, AND THE MAKING OF THE ALIEN IN AMER I CA
Beth Lew- Williams
Cambridge, Mas sa chu setts · London, England 2018
Copyright © 2018 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College All rights reserved Printed in the United States of Amer i ca
First printing
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Lew- Williams, Beth, author. Title: The Chinese must go : vio lence, exclusion, and the making of the
alien in Amer i ca / Beth Lew- Williams. Description: Cambridge, Mas sa chu setts : Harvard University Press,
2018. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2017032640 | ISBN 9780674976016 (cloth) Subjects: LCSH: Chinese— United States— History—19th century. |
Chinese— Vio lence against— United States. | Border security— United States— History—19th century. | Race discrimination— United States— History—19th century. | Emigration and immigration law— United States— History—19th century. | Aliens— United States— History—19th century. | Citizens—United States— History—19th century. | United States— Race relations— History—19th century.
Classification: LCC E184.C5 L564 2018 | DDC 305.895 / 1073— dc23 LC rec ord available at https:// lccn.loc . gov / 2017032640
Cover photo courtesy of the Oregon Historical Society, image number 28159
Cover design by Jill Breitbarth
In memory of Lew Din Wing
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
The Vio lence of Exclusion 1
PART 1 • Restriction
1. The Chinese Question 17 2. Experiments in Restriction 53
PART 2 • Vio lence
3. The Banished 91 4. The People 113 5. The Loyal 137
PART 3 • Exclusion
6 . The Exclusion Consensus 169 7. Afterlives under Exclusion 194
EPILOGUE
The Modern American Alien 235
APPENDIX A
Sites of Anti- Chinese Expulsions and Attempted Expulsions, 1885–1887 247
APPENDIX B
Chinese Immigration to the United States, 1850–1904 253
ABBREVIATIONS 255 NOTES 259 ACKNOWL EDGMENTS 337 INDEX 341
THE
Chinese Must Go
1
INTRODUCTION
The Vio lence of Exclusion
THEY LEFT IN driving rain. Three hundred Chinese mi grants trudged down the center of the street, their heads bowed to the ele ments and the crowd. They were led, followed, and surrounded by dozens of white men armed with clubs, pistols, and rifles. As if part of a grim parade, they were encircled by spectators who packed the muddy sidewalks, peered from narrow doorways, and leaned out from second- story win dows for a better view. One of the Chinese, Tak Nam, tried to protest, but later he remembered the mob answering in a single voice: “All the Chinese, you must go. Every one.”1
The date was November 3, 1885, and the place was Tacoma, Washington Territory. But that hardly mattered. In 1885 and 1886, at least 168 commu- nities across the U.S. West drove out their Chinese residents.2
At times, these purges involved racial vio lence in its most brazen and basic form: physical force motivated by racial prejudice and intended to cause bodily harm.3 The vigilantes targeted all Chinese people— young and old, male and female, rich and poor— planting bombs beneath businesses, shooting blindly through cloth tents, and setting homes ablaze. Once physical vio lence had become a very real threat, the vigilantes also drove them out using subtler forces of coercion, harassment, and intimidation. They posted deadlines for the Chinese to vacate town, leaving unspoken the conse- quences of noncompliance. They locked up leaders of the Chinese commu- nity and watched as the rest fled. They called for boycotts of Chinese workers and waited for starvation to set in. This too was racial vio lence.
While historians often claim that racial vio lence is fundamental to the making of the United States, rarely are they referring to the Chinese in the
Sites of Anti- Chinese Expulsions, 1885–1886. Vigilantes drove out Chinese residents through harassment, intimidation, arson, bombing, assault, and murder. Map based on data collected by the author (see Appendix A).
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California
Colorado
Idaho Territory
Montana Territory
Nevada
Oregon
Utah Territory
Washington Territory
Alaska Territory
Wyoming Territory
New Mexico Territory
Arizona Territory
INTRODUCTION 3
U.S. West. Instead, they are thinking of moments when racial prejudice fu- eled the vio lence of colonization, enslavement, and segregation.4 It has long been recognized that these transformative acts of racial vio lence anchor not only the history of Native Americans and African Americans, but also the history of the entire nation. Anti- Chinese vio lence, however, is routinely left out of the national narrative.5
It is easy to see this omission as simply due to the relative numbers. There were comparatively few Chinese in nineteenth- century Amer i ca, and fewer still who lost their lives to racial vio lence, making casualty counts from anti- Chinese vio lence appear inconsequential. The 1880 census recorded 105,465 Chinese in the United States; at least eighty- five perished during the peak of anti- Chinese vio lence in the mid-1880s. However, these numbers do not capture the full extent of the vio lence, since some of the most egregious in- cidents occurred before or after this period. In 1871, for example, a mob in Los Angeles lynched seventeen “Chinamen” in Negro Alley in front of dozens of witnesses and, in 1887, the “citizens of Colusa” (California) took a com- memorative photo graph after the lynching of sixteen- year- old Hong Di. Events like these have drawn attention for their exceptional brutality, but often anti- Chinese vio lence was not fatal or recorded. By relying on the metric of known fatalities, historians have often viewed anti- Chinese vio- lence as a faint echo of the staggeringly lethal vio lence unleashed against Native Americans and African Americans.6 When we use black oppression and Indian extermination to define racial vio lence in nineteenth- century Amer i ca, Chinese expulsions seem insignificant. Or, even more inaccurately, they appear not to be violent at all.
The omission of this history can also be explained by the vio lence itself. Chinese migration to the U.S. West began in the 1850s, when thousands of Chinese joined the rush for gold in California. While other newcomers claimed a place in Amer i ca and American history, however, vio lence pushed the Chinese to the outer recesses of the nation and national memory. In Ta- coma, there were no Chinese after 1885 and, thanks to arsonists, there are no physical remnants of what once had been. Indeed, the city of Tacoma, in a present- day effort at “reconciliation,” spent over a de cade searching for de- scendants of the Tacoma Chinese, but has yet to find any.7 Successful ex- pulsions left little behind, even in the way of memories.
Above all, this history has been neglected because it has been misunder- stood. The violent anti- Chinese movement was not a weak imitation of
It was rare for Chinese mi grants to be lynched, and rarer still for a lynching to be photographed. Hong Di was a convicted murderer sentenced to life in prison, but unnamed “citizens” removed him from jail and hanged him on a railroad turnstile. “Hong Di, Lynched by the citizens of Colusa, July 11, 1887 at 1:15 a.m.,” BANC PIC 2003.165. Courtesy of the Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
racial vio lence elsewhere. It was a distinct phenomenon that must be con- sidered on its own terms. Even without lethal force, anti- Chinese vio lence had profound and lasting consequences, although not the ones we might expect.
What made anti- Chinese vio lence distinct was its principal intent, together with its method and result.
The intent was exclusion. At the local level, anti- Chinese advocates fought to prohibit Chinese from entering spaces and working in occupations deemed the sole entitlement of white citizens. At the national level, they fought to bar Chinese mi grants from entering the United States and to deny citizen- ship to those already in the country. At the international level, they fought to exclude China from the conversation about immigration, hoping to turn a bilateral policy into a unilateral one. Though scholars sometimes separate these demands into disparate strains of racism, nativism, and imperialism, respectively, anti- Chinese advocates rarely drew these distinctions. In their minds, the threat of Chinese immigration demanded exclusion across mul- tiple spheres.
At the time, national exclusion was a particularly radical objective. Al- though border control may seem natu ral and inevitable today, the United States began with a policy of open migration for all. In the early nineteenth century, the federal government was more concerned with attracting “desir- able” immigrants than prohibiting “undesirable” ones. Though individual states sometimes regulated immigrants they deemed criminal, poverty- stricken, or diseased, the federal government was not in the business of border control.8 This meant that there was no need for passports, no concept of an “illegal alien,” and no consensus that the United States should determine the makeup of its citizenry by closing its gates.
Anti- Chinese advocates demanded that the federal government change all this. Chinese exclusion warranted extreme mea sures, they argued, because the Chinese posed a peculiar racial threat to nineteenth- century Amer i ca. Popu lar thought of the day held that the Chinese race was inferior to the white race in most ways, but not all. The Chinese were heathen and servile, but also dangerously industrious, cunning, and resilient. Chinese mi grants hailed from an ancient and populous nation, which Americans granted had
INTRODUCTION 5
6 THE CHINESE MUST GO
once been home to an advanced civilization. Assumed to be permanently loyal to China, the Chinese appeared racially incapable of becoming American. While white citizens worried that Native Americans and African Americans would contaminate the nation, they feared the Chinese might conquer it. One anti- Chinese leader in Tacoma, for example, openly wor- ried that if “millions of industrious hard- working sons and daughters of Confucius” were “given an equal chance with our people,” they “would outdo them in the strug gle for life and gain possession of the Pacific coast of Amer i ca.”9 Therefore, as Americans turned to dispossession, subordination, and assimilation of Indians and blacks in the late nineteenth century, they ad- vocated exclusion for the Chinese. Behind these divergent racial scripts lay callous calculations. White Americans coveted Indian lands and required black labor, but many saw no reason to tolerate the Chinese.10
Not all white Americans agreed, however. In the mid- nineteenth century, many U.S. traders, cap i tal ists, and missionaries saw Chinese migration as key to American profits and power. Businessmen eyed luxurious Chinese products and vast Chinese markets, while Protestant missionaries saw an op- portunity to convert “heathens” on both sides of the Pacific. In the minds of cosmopolitan expansionists, American people and goods crossing the Pacific would extend U.S. power abroad, while the reverse movement of Chinese mi grants would accelerate the development of the West and strengthen U.S. claims on China.11 Envisioning Amer i ca’s future beyond the Pacific Ocean and the rewards they personally would reap, these influ- ential elites strongly opposed the movement for exclusion. This re sis tance, however, only emboldened the movement’s advocates and drove them to more dramatic tactics later in the nineteenth century.
The principal method of anti- Chinese vio lence became expulsion. Since their arrival in the 1850s Chinese mi grants had been popu lar targets for harassment and assault, but systematic expulsion became the method of choice by the 1880s. In western states and territories (where 99 percent of Chinese resided), vigilantes used boycotts, arsons, and assaults to swiftly remove the Chinese from their towns and prevent their return.12 And while the campaigns to drive out the Chinese sometimes produced casual- ties, these were rarely by design. Two men died on the forced march from Tacoma, but according to Tak Nam, the deaths did not directly result from physical assault. At a redress hearing following the expulsion, he described
how the crowd used clubs, poles, and pistols “to shove[] us down” and “drive us like so many hogs.” It was in this context that, after an eight- mile forced march and a night “in the drenching rain,” “two Chinamen died from exposure.”13
Though the vigilantes set their sights on ridding themselves of Chinese neighbors, the expulsions were not simply local means directed toward local ends. Using sweeping rhe toric and direct petitioning, vigilantes translated their vio lence into a broader cry for exclusion. Anti- Chinese vio lence, in other words, was a form of po liti cal action or, more specifically, what could be termed “violent racial politics.” By directing racial vio lence against local targets, vigilantes asserted a national po liti cal agenda. These vigilantes, of course, lacked the power to determine U.S. law or diplomacy; a host of po- liti cal forces and contingent events created the ultimate policy of exclusion. But the vigilantes made Chinese exclusion pos si ble, even probable, when their violent protests drew the national spotlight. The federal policy of Chi- nese exclusion, touted as a solution to Chinese migration, was also designed to combat the more immediate threat of white vio lence.
That vio lence held power over U.S. politics in the nineteenth century should not come as a surprise. Transformative moments of state vio lence— including the Mexican- American War (1846–1848), the Civil War (1861– 1865), and the Indian Wars— clearly mediated politics through force, but so too did a host of extralegal battles. Violent racial politics swelled in popu- larity in the Reconstruction South and in western territories where white citizens lacked more recognized forms of po liti cal power. This racial vio lence terrorized local populations, shaped local politics, and, at times, advanced a national agenda. In the mid- nineteenth century, po liti cal vio lence, and the rhe toric that accompanied it, challenged the federal government’s reserva- tion of Indian lands, enfranchisement of African Americans, and toleration of Chinese migration. By the century’s end, the federal government had ac- quiesced to violent demands for Indian dispossession, black oppression, and Chinese exclusion.14
The principal result of anti- Chinese vio lence was the modern American alien. The term “alien” has long referred to foreigners, strangers, and out- siders, and in U.S. law has come to define foreign- born persons on American soil who have not been naturalized. Admittedly, “alien” has become un- pleasant or even offensive to our modern ears, and recently scholars and
INTRODUCTION 7
journalists have begun to replace it with “noncitizen.” This more neutral alternative, however, is too imprecise for the subject at hand. In the nine- teenth century, the term “noncitizen” would have encompassed a large and diverse group, including, at vari ous times, slaves, free blacks, Native Ameri- cans, and colonial subjects.15 We cannot simply do away with the word “alien,” therefore, since it offers historical accuracy and specificity. In this book, the term is used cautiously to describe a par tic u lar legal and social status, not an intrinsic trait. The Chinese entered Amer i ca as mi grants and were made into aliens, in law and society. Through a halting pro cess of ex- clusion at the local, national, and international levels, the Chinese mi grant became the quin tes sen tial alien in Amer i ca by the turn of the twentieth century.16
At the local level, vio lence hardened the racial bound aries of the U.S. West. Men like Tak Nam had established themselves in polyglot communi- ties, living and working alongside white and Native Americans. He had resided in Tacoma for nine years before his expulsion, and in the country for thirty- three. Then vio lence made neighbors into strangers, figuratively and literally, as vigilantes disavowed any connection to the Chinese and drove them into unfamiliar surroundings. In addition to killing scores in the mid- 1880s, the vio lence displaced more than 20,000. In the pro cess, it acceler- ated Chinese segregation in the U.S. West, spurred a great migration to the East, and hastened return migration to China.17
As violent racial politics removed Chinese from local communities, it proved similarly effective at excluding them from the nation. Before the out- break of vio lence in 1885 and 1886, Congress attempted to balance com- peting demands to close Amer i ca’s gates and open the door to China. In 1882, American leaders created a temporary bilateral compromise: a law known as the Chinese Restriction Act. Only after the law’s public failure and the ensuing vio lence did Congress turn to a long- term policy of unilat- eral “Chinese exclusion” in 1888. The change in nomenclature signaled a major shift in law, enforcement, and intent, as Congress narrowed the ave- nues for Chinese migration, dedicated more resources to enforcement, and expanded U.S. imperialism in Asia. Historians, with their eyes trained on what Chinese exclusion would become, have overlooked the distinction between the Restriction Period (1882–1888) and Exclusion Period (1888–1943). To understand the radicalism of Chinese exclusion and the contingent
8 THE CHINESE MUST GO
history of its rise, we must recognize the period of restriction, experimenta- tion, and contestation that preceded it.18
Together, the restriction and exclusion laws dissuaded untold thousands of Chinese mi grants from settling in the United States and, by separating men from women, stunted the growth of an American- born Chinese popu- lation. With time, Chinese exclusion became Asian exclusion as policies first practiced on the Chinese provided a blueprint for laws targeting Japa nese, Korean, South Asian, and Filipino mi grants in the early twentieth century.19 As a consequence, in 1950 these groups made up only 0.2 percent of the U.S. population; even in the twenty- first century, only a small fraction of Asian Americans can trace their American roots back more than one generation.20 We can appreciate the significance of exclusion if we imagine what could have been.
